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THE WORDS OF COMPARATIVE LAW
Olivier Mor6teau*
Abstract: While the word "comparative" refers to a cognitive and intellectual
activity supposing that there are several elements to compare, the word "law"
is used in the singular, as if law was to be compared to itself The whole phrase
indicates that comparison takes place within the study of the law, but the use
of the singular does not point to a pluralistic approach: what do we mean by
law? Should we not talk about "comparing the laws" or "legal comparison"?
With a reflection on the words of the law as a starting point, this paper
visits the corpus ofcomparative law in a pluralistic perspective and the process
as a basic element of cognition. Words of the comparatists are then visited in
successive steps describing what they do: first the discovery of the foreign
legal system with immersion in its language and culture yet keeping some
outsider awareness to read the silence in language. Then comes the need to
communicate on this other legal system, which is in essence an experience in
translation. Based on what they learn, comparatists also build systems, using
or developing common words in the various realms of international law, often
for practical purposes. Last but not least, some aspire to develop neutral terms
for the sake of knowledge in order to develop a specialty language of legal
science. This latter activity tends to be neglected as a utopian aspiration. It
encompasses the creation of precise terms and meta-categories. In any case,
words are the tool of comparatists and therefore constantly evolve.
Keywords: words; comparative law; pluralism; cultural immersion;
translation, specialty language

I.

Introduction: Words of the Law

Jurists trained in the Western legal traditions can hardly conceive of any form
of legal activity without the instrumentality of words. Their ancestors honoured
Themis - goddess of divine law, order and customs - represented as blindfolded
and holding a sword, which would later change into words ("sword" became
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"words" with "s" moving to the end). Except when considering taboos, which is
the business of the anthropologist, the Western jurist is of the opinion that: "it is on
the loom of language that all law is spun".' Whether the law is crafted by legislative
or court language or doctrinal writing, or based on people's behaviour, it is rarely
administered without the agency of human language and cannot be thought or
described, comparatively or otherwise, without the instrumentality of words:2 the
Westerner is of the opinion that "law is power dressed in words"3 and "when words
fail, no law remains". 4 Section II of this paper will prove that this is not true: law
can exist without words.5 The central point however will be to discuss the words
that we use in comparing legal systems, whether or not we use words, gestures or
combinations thereof
In this regard, scholars mostly use terminology created by those who administer
the law, though the history of Roman law and the civil law tradition shows that the
language of scholarship can also shape legal practice. 6 The language of the law is
a mix of everyday words and technical terms. Whether they create, administer or
study the law, lawyers like to use ordinary words with a technical meaning like
"fruit" and "cause" in the civil law, "breach" and "frustration" in the common law
and "damages" and "constitution" in both, and occasionally invent complex words
unlikely to be used outside some legal context, such as "antichresis", "emphyteusis"
7
or "writ of certiorari".

When writing his famous Bramble Bush in 1930, Karl Llewellyn pointed out
our sins in using technical words:

1 CG Weeramantry, Law in Crisis, Bridges of Understanding(London: Capemoss, 1975) p.133.
2 Peter Grossfeld, The Strength and Weakness ofComparativeLaw, trans. Tony Weir (Oxford: Clarendon,
1990) pp. 9 2- 9 4 describes law as a creature of language. Annabelle Mooney, Language and Law (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) points to the unusual character of legal language, often called legalese:
23. See also Harold J Berman, Law and Language, Effective Symbols of Community (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2013).
47

Jaakko Husa, A New Introduction to ComparativeLaw (Oxford: Hart, 2015) p.
Grossfeld, The Strength and Weakness of ComparativeLaw (n.2) p.93 insisting that without "I swear",
.

3
4

there is no oath. "We speak of 'canonical forms of words', of 'constitutive' or 'effective' speech acts",
citing JL Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1975) and
John R. Searle, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory ofSpeech Acts (Cambridge University

Press, 1979). See more recently Antonio Gambarro, "Law, Language and Meaning: The Performatives in
a Multilingual Context" in Rodolfo Sacco (ed.), The NewAmbitions ofLegal Science:LegalAnthropology

.

and Legal Traductology (Rome: Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, 2009) p.55 and Andrei Marmor, The
Language ofLaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 12 - 2 2
Rodolfo Sacco, Il diritto muto: Neuroscienze, conoscenza tacita, valori condivisi (Bologna: II Mulino,
2015).
See Helmut Coing, "The Roman Law as ius commune on the Continent" (1973) 89 LQR 505.
I will not add "estoppel" to these latter category of terms because it comes from the French "estouper",
meaning to plug, to close, and by extension prevent, and was also used inthe context of sexual intercourse:

6
7

Frederic Godefroy, Dictionnairede l'ancienne languefrangaise, et de tous ses dialectes, du LMeme au
XVeme siecle (Paris, 1884), vo estouper. See Olivier Moreteau, L'estoppel et laprotectionde la confiance
legitime, Elements d'un renouveau du droit de la responsabilite(Droitanglaiset droitfrangais) (These,

Lyon, 1990) p. 1 3

.
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Legal usage of technical words has sinned, and does still, in two respects;
it is involved in ambiguity of two kinds: multiple senses of the same term,
and terms too broad to be precise in application to the details of single
disputes. First, it does not use terms in single senses, but uses the same
term in several senses; and in several senses, indiscriminately, without
awareness. This invites confusion, it makes bad logic almost inevitable,
it makes clear statement of clear thought difficult, it makes clear thought
itself improbable. No logician worth his salt would stand for it; no scientist
would stand for it.'
This paper addresses the words used by legal scholars when engaging in comparative
legal studies, assuming that they do not necessarily coincide with the terminology
of the legal systems explored by the comparatist.
The legal vocabulary is particularly rich, as for English alone, we count over
25,000 entries in the Black's Law Dictionary.9 If we compare with the 171,476
words in current use in the 1989, 20-volume edition of the Oxford English
Dictionary, this would mean that approximately one word out of seven conveys a
legal meaning. Though numerous, legal terms may not be sufficient in numbers or
precision of meaning because lawyering and legal scholarship keep wrestling with
polysemy.
Llewelyn points his angry finger at polysemy, characterising it as a sin. Legal
scholars may be sinning when they use technical terms such as "cause", meaning
for the French causaor the reason why one enters into a contract, causation in the
context of civil liability, case in the context of civil procedure. One also sins using
"condition", meaning in the English common law context, a condition precedent
or subsequent but also an essential term in a contract. We sin with the most general
words like droit, which in civil law parlance means "law" in the general sense
(droit objectif) or "right" in a more precise sense (droit subjectif), while "law"
in a common law context may designate law in general, embracing statute law,
common law, equity or combinations of these terms. English and French speakers
are no doubt great sinners, but they are not the only ones.
The Germans by contrast might qualify as saints, at least in the eyes of
Llewellyn, who spent some of his young years in Germany" and brought some

8 Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush, on Our Law and Its Study (New York: Oceana, 1978) p.83. George
Orwell, "Politics and the English Language" George Orwell: Essays (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
2003) p. 9 5 4 rather criticised the "inflated style": Judith D Fischer, "Why George Orwell's Ideas About
Language Skill Matter for Lawyers" (2007) 68 MontanaLaw Review 129.
9 In its 10th edition (St Paul: Thomson Reuters, 2014) at the time of writing. The Preface to the
7th edition (1999) reveals the addition of 4,500 entries to the 20,000 in previous editions. The Association
Henri Capitant Vocabulairejuridique,by Gerard Cornu, counted over 10,000 entries in the 10th edition
(Presses universitaires de France, 2014) p.vii, note 1.
10 To which one may add 47,156 obsolete words, available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/explore/
how-many-words-are-there-in-the-english-language/ (visited 26 March 2019).
11 Arthur L Corbin, "A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn" (1962) 71 Yale LI 805.
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civilian German concepts to the United States.' 2 Germans in general and German
lawyers since the time of the Pandects 3 do not like polysemy, and avoid it at all
costs in law making. They create compound words so that one word means only
one thing. Where in English we talk of "hardship" and in French of imprtvision,
words that would fail a Llewellyn test, they say Wegfalldesgeschcftsgrundlage,
meaning that the very foundation of the agreement goes away, this because due to
unforeseen events, one party would be bound to tender a performance excessively
onerous or excessively cheap compared to what the parties reasonably expected at
the time of contracting. When borrowing this German doctrine, the Italians coined
the term eccessiva onerositc, which does not include the word contract but is
precise enough and may pass Llewellyn's test." This incursion into German proves
that in fabricating and using technical legal terms, we can do better. This favours
more accurate communication among experts, at the cost of confusing lay people
to whom laws are meant to apply:" while the French favoured plain language at
least in the Civil Code,1 6 Germans made the choice of computer-like precision and
mathematical complexity."
Things are radically different in East-Asian cultures. In China, Confucius brought
in a deep distrust of laws. "The true cohesion of a society is secured not through legal
rules but through ritual observances".'" According to Confucius, a king leads by his
moral power' 9 and words are of central importance. As Confucius explained:
If the names are not correct, if they do not match realities, language has no
object. If language is without an object, action becomes impossible - and
therefore, all human affairs disintegrate and their management becomes
pointless and impossible. Hence, the very first task of a true statesman is
to rectify the names.2 0

12 James Whitman, "Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for
the Uniform Commercial Code" (1987) 97 Yale LI 156.
13 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kdtz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, Trans. Tony Weir (Oxford:

.

Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 1998) pp. 14 3 - 14 8
14 See art.1467 of the Italian Civil Code.
15 In the United States, the movement towards plain language legal writing started with David Mellinkoff,
The Language of the Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963). It influenced federal legislation such
as the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 and the Plain Writing Act of 2010. See also, in a broader
perspective, Karen A. Schriver, "Plain Language in the U.S. Gains Momentum: 1940-2015", (2017) 60:4
IEEE Transactionson ProfessionalCommunication 343.

16 Jean Leclair, "Le Code civil des Franqais de 1804: une transaction entre revolution et reaction" (2002)
77 Revuejuridique Themis 1, 21 and Olivier Moreteau, "Codes as Strait-Jackets, Safeguards and Alibis:
The Experience of the French Civil Code" (1995) 20 North CarolinaJournalof InternationalLaw and
14 5

.

CommercialRegulation 273, 279.
14 4
17 Zweigert and Kdtz, An Introductionto ComparativeLaw (a 13) pp.
-

.

18 Simon Leys, The Hall of Uselessness, CollectedEssays (New York: New York Review of Books, 2013)
p.322. See also TheAnalects of Confucius,Trans. and notes by SimonLeys (alias Pierre Ryckmans) (New
York and London: Norton, 1997).
19 Simon Leys, The Hall of Uselessness, CollectedEssays (a 18) p. 3 2 3
20 Ibid.
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What is it that we compare? Section II reflects on the words of the title of this
article, showing how problematic they are. Section III addresses the language of
the comparatists: what words do we use when describing and comparing legal
systems? The whole article will show that words of comparative law, much like
comparative law itself, are on the move.

II.

Comparing What? Words of the Title

The words "comparative law" and their equivalent in other languages (droit
compare, diritto comparato, Rechtsvergleichung) have been there for well over
hundred years, and attracted international attention in 1900 with the Paris Congrds
internationalde droitcompare,2 1 later to flourish after World War II22 with a focus
on convergence, universalism and a trend towards harmonisation. 23
Forefathers like Edouard Lambert, who was inspired by his master Raymond
Saleilles, drew a distinction between "comparative history" (histoirecomparative)
and "comparative legislation"(legislationcomparde), and interestingly, the French
terms distinguish between "comparative" and "compared". They use "comparative"
with history, a process, and "compared" with legislation, pointing to a body of legal
rules, soon to be addressed as law (droitcompare). Both perspectives tend to merge
nowadays in comparative legal history.24
What is it that we compare and what does it mean to be comparative? This is
asking the question of the corpus on the one hand and the process on the other. It
is an invitation to reflect on the words "law" and "comparative", starting with the
substantive and then discussing the adjective.

A.

The Corpus

The reports presented in Paris in 1900 show that Lambert, Saleilles and other
participants were aware of the need to extend the scope of comparative studies
beyond legislation, 25 and to target doctrinal literature and court decisions, all
elements later redefined as legal formants 26 . They also characterised the comparative
approach as a science, while acknowledging concrete applications when it came to

21 Congres internationalde droitcompare 1900, Proces-verbaux des seances et documents (Paris: LGDJ,

1905).
22 See, eg, HC Gutteridge, ComparativeLaw: An Introductionto the ComparativeMethod ofLegal Study

and Research (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946).
23 Vivian Grosswald Curran, ComparativeLaw, An Introduction (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2002)
pp.7-29.
24 Olivier Moreteau, Aniceto Masferrer and Kjell A Modeer (eds.), ComparativeLegal History (London:
Elgar, 2019).
25 A Societe de legislation comparee had been founded in Paris in 1869, operating under that name.
26 Rodolfo Sacco, "Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law" (1991) 39:1 American
Journalof ComparativeLaw 1-34 continued in (1991) 39:2 American Journal of ComparativeLaw

343-401.
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improving the law or facilitating transnational activities, a chief motivation in the
foundation of the Institut de droit compare Edouard Lambert in Lyon.27 It was also
made clear that the corpus was to include unwritten law such as custom and usages:
Lambert pushed his disciples to study usages and custom in the workplace and in
international trade.28
Addressing custom, however, the focus tends to be on those usages that are
recognised and enforced by state authorities. Such usages tend to be regarded as
customary law by both the civil law and the common law. In the 1980s, attempts
were made to disconnect custom from state law, in the context of international trade.
Rend David demonstrated that many transnational norms applied in the context of
international business transactions find no support in state law and can be described
as droitnon-tatique.29 This is an area of the law where professional organisations
such as the International Chamber of Commerce and many other non-governmental
trade organisations keep track of evolving usages and put them in written form, in
publications that are regularly updated.3 0 The concept of "stateless law" (the idea
that law can exist without the state as the primary source of creation, enforcement
and legitimacy of law or that social norms without the sanction of state law may
coexist with state law) has gained currency in recent literature,3 ' though "stateless
law" may not be the best term to translate droit non-ttatique. The concept is fuzzy
and unclear, defined as "a form of law in which the social context is as important
as the text".32 Thus defined, it may include soft law and many other fuzzy things.
These developments show that comparatists go beyond the written and unwritten
norms to address social context, which is central to the development of custom.
Legal pluralists such as Roderick Macdonald and Jacques Vanderlinden
enlarge the scope of investigation and invite us to rethink the corpus ofcomparative
studies. Vanderlinden identifies no less than four different uses of the word custom
in legal discourse:33

27 Edouard Lambert, L Institut de Droit Compare, son programme, ses mithodes d'enseignement (Lyon,

Rey, 1921).
28 Olivier Morteau, "Edouard Lambert et l'enseignement du droit comme science sociale et comparative"
in David Deroussin (ed.), Le renouveau des sciences sociales etjuridiquessous la I Republique: La
Facult de droitde Lyon (Paris: La m6moire du droit, 2007) pp. 193, 196-197; Lejuristefrangaisentre
2
ethnocentrisme et mondialisation(Paris: Dalloz, 2014) pp. 12-214.
29 Rend David, Le droit du commerce international.Reflexions d'un comparatistesur le droit international

privP (Paris: Economica, 1987).
30 See for instance the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits publishedby the International
Chamber of Commerce, known in their present version as UCP 600, globally referred to in letters of
credits, a largely unregulated area of banking activity.
31 See, for example, Helge Dedek and Shauna Van Praagh (eds.), Stateless Law: Evolving Boundaries ofa
Discipline (Oxford: Routledge, 2015). For a useful review of this book, see (2017) 21 EdinburghLaw
Review 315-317.
32 Ibid., 3.

33 Jacques Vanderlinden, "Here, There and Everywhere . . or Nowhere? Some Comparative and Historical
Afterthoughts About Custom as a Source of Law" in Mordteau et al., ComparativeLegal History (n.24)
140ff
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(1) The supposed original policies prevailing in Western European communities
prior to the revival of Roman law or in overseas communities before
colonialism. The word also enables [the observer] to escape a systematic
anachronistic or analocalistic34 reference to "law".
(2) A specific formal source of law (along with legislation, case law, legal
science or legal acts) inherited from Rome by the self-styled 'jurists" of
Western Europe and developed within particular legal systems from the
thirteenth century onwards, also called "customary law" by legal historians.
(3) So much of indigenous law of a colony as the colonial administration
recognised, which are commonly referred to as "customary law".
(4) The remnants of original pre-colonial policies [or practices] still existing
in "colonial" communities, which continue to function under colonial rule
and the post-independence "new" policies, all functioning as autonomous,
possibly clandestine (and often considered by the state as illegal tensionsolving mechanisms in various social contexts). 35
Vanderlinden first discusses custom (2) and (3), showing how custom, allegedly a
form of spontaneous law that develops from the doings of the people, happened in
a number of significant jurisdictions to be confiscated by emerging royal powers.
In France, this was the drafting of customs, starting under an order by King Charles
VII in 1454.36 The moment judges got hold of a coutumier, the name given to a
record of customs existing in a given region, they typically refused to consider any
argument that the usage may have changed, and treated the coutumier as a written
law. 37 As Vanderlinden notes, "Originally and essentially connected to spontaneous
life action and experience, custom is transformed in either a doctrinal or a statutory
source of law, as it takes the written form".38 He shows that the same happened
in England when the royal courts deprived the people of Kent of the custom of
gavelkind, a system of tenure promoting equal division of land among the heirs of
the landholder. As it conflicted with primogeniture, judges insisted that all customs
of Kent be reduced into writing, then refusing to hear of any custom that was not

34 The adjective comes from the noun analocalism, usedby Vanderlinden in order to designate the unjustified
transfer of a notion applicable in one place to another where it is not applicable, Jacques Vanderlinden,
363

.

Lespluralismesjuridiques(Brussels, Bruylant, 2013) p.

.

35 Vanderlinden, "Here, There and Everywhere . . or Nowhere? Some Comparative and Historical
Afterthoughts About Custom as a Source of Law" (n.33) p.143.
36 Ordinance of Montil-Les-Tours, 15 April 1454, art.125.
37 Jacques Vanderlinden, "La coutume dans le droit frangais des pays de coutumes aux XVP, XVIe et
XVIIe si&cles" La coutume, Recuei/s de la Societe Jean Bodin, t. LII (Brussels: De Boeck Universite,
1990) p. 2 8 3
38 Vanderlinden, "Here, There and Everywhere . . or Nowhere? Some Comparative and Historical
Afterthoughts About Custom as a Source of Law" (n.33) p.146, also insisting on the fact that the drafting
of custom was not made by representatives of the people butby "a King's official or ajudge or a group of
persons made up of members of the nobility, the clergy, and the middle class" (ibid.). On the drafting
of customs, see John Gilissen (ed.), La redaction des coutumes dans le passe et le present (Brussels:

Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie, 1962).
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recorded.3 9 Vanderlinden tries to make sense of what happened in France and in
England, pointing to a trend towards the elaboration of a unitary system, issues
that pertain to knowledge and also a sense of social and intellectual superiority of
those administering the law, stigmatising "an impossible couple" between lawyers
and custom.40 "Customary law" was to become a construct that, even in the opinion
of the historians, had to be documented, though it is essentially oral and gestural.
Whether one looks at custom (2) (post-Roman law) or (3) (colonial), we
witness this Western assumption that customary law or custom must be mandatory
to qualify as legal.4 ' We Westerners have locked the definition of the law: we are
not willing to regard as law rules and processes that are not mandatory and not
enforced by state authorities. 42
This is where we turn to Vanderlinden's custom (1) and (4). To understand this,
we must move outside the model of the state's monopoly to define and implement
the laws, which brings us to the realm of legal pluralism. The individual must be
placed at the centre and considered as subjected to several networks of rules, some
state-based (and properly legal as we define it) and others stateless, such as religion,
professional groups, social or sport associations, criminal organisations and groups of
all kinds. Not all these norms would qualify as law as we define it, but the life of the
individual is conditioned by these networks ofnorms and often-conflicting policies. 4 3
We know very little of pre-Revival of Roman law customs of Western Europe
(custom (1) above), but Vanderlinden, whilst warning against the "doubly mortal
sin" of anachronism and analocalism, shares his intuition that there may be
similarities with custom (4), existing in Africa pre-colonisation and re-emerging
after independence.4 4 Law in these societies can be defined, in Gabon as "ivanga",
meaning "what man does"45 or "Diola" in Senegal, where the village chief says that
what he enforces is "the ways of doing of the Diola". 46 Where chiefs appear to have

39 Ibid., noting that with few exceptions such as CK Allen, Law in the Making (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 7th ed., 1966), most authors do not discuss custom in the context of English law.
40 Ibid., p.147. See also Jacques Vanderlinden, "Le juriste et la coutume, un couple impossible ? (bis) ou,
A propos de Mdthode d'interprdtation et sources, contrepoint au depart d'une image frangaise de la loi
et du juge" in Philippe Jestaz (ed.), Franqois Giny, mythe et rdalitis (Paris: Dalloz, 2000) p. 5 5 and
Jacques Vanderlinden, "Rdseaux, pyramide et pluralisme ou regards sur la rencontre de deux aspirantsparadigmes de la science juridique" (2002) 49 Revue interdisciplinaired'Ptudesjuridiques11.

41 Vanderlinden, "Here, There and Everywhere . . or Nowhere? Some Comparative and Historical
Afterthoughts About Custom as a Source of Law" (n.33) p.150 notes the effort to make the custom more
accessible by writing "if a man wishes to take a wife, he will ask the parents of the woman" rather than "the
consent of the parents of the woman is required as an essential condition of the celebration of the marriage".
42 This perspective is challenged in contemporary literature. See the essays gathered in Sean Patrick Donlan
and Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler (eds.), The ConceptsofLaw, Comparative,Jurisprudential,and Social
Sciences Perspectives(Burlington: Ashgate, 2014).
43 See Vanderlinden, Les pluralismesjuridiques(n.34).

44 Vanderlinden, "Here, There and Everywhere . . or Nowhere? Some Comparative and Historical
Afterthoughts About Custom as a Source of Law" (n.33) pp.160-161.
45 Etienne Le Roy, "Justice africaine et oralit6juridique" (1974) 36 Bulletin de lInstitutfrangaisdAfrique
noire 559.
46 Etienne Le Roy, L'esprit de la coutume et l'ideologie de la loi, La connaissance du droit en Afrique

.

(Brussels: Academie royale des sciences d'outre-mer, 1985) p. 2 10
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absolute power, one discovers that there is no chief without subjects and that the
making of a chief is the result of a mysterious alchemy with countless variables.
All of what would be regulated by institutions and rules in the West appears to be
conditioned by "ways of doing" in other cultures.4
Now, does it mean we have to regard all this as the law? Vanderlinden eventually
resisted and now says that "law" should be used only where there is a state, if we
want to avoid polysemy." However, that does not mean that custom (1) and (4)
are to be left out of our comparative efforts. For the sake of language consistency,
Vanderlinden suggests renaming custom (1) and (4) "do" because it reflects what
is being done in a group, regardless of whether mandatory or not. Very often these
are mechanisms aiming at re-establishing social harmony in the group, which may
fully ignore Western ideas of guilt or culpa, as is the case with the Inuit.4 9
We must be able, when we look at these legal systems, to go beyond what we
call law, whether in the form of legislation or custom. Not that we must describe
"non-legal" mechanisms as "law" for very often they are not. But because these
mechanisms are used where in the Western world we resort to the law, they must
be taken into account as elements of the corpus and therefore be included in the
comparative process. They are more than context to be aware of when looking
at the corpus of what constitutes law: they are processes filling the tasks that we
typically assign to the law, and therefore belong to the corpus.
For example, can we look at the law of China, ignoring the multitude of "nonlegal" mechanisms that are cultural and political, and focus only on what resembles
what we are doing in the West? 0 Doing this may lead to a misconception in our
understanding of how China works, with the centrality of the Party controlling
judicial decisions just as much as it does politics and every aspect of social and
economic life. Obviously, the Chinese culture, as well as the influence of the Party,
must be taken into account as elements of the corpus.5
The reader will not find here a new definition of the word "law" but may
come to realise that this word, used in the singular in the term "comparative law",
may be too narrow to cover the larger scope of what we need to investigate in
our comparative activity, particularly when we consider non-Western societies.

47 Vanderlinden, "Here, There and Everywhere . . or Nowhere? Some Comparative and Historical
Afterthoughts About Custom as a Source of Law" (n.33) p.163.
48 Ibid., p.164.

.

This is where the distinction between law and norm and the restriction of the former to statecontrolled norm seems to me essential for the sake of clarity. Hence, considering legal and
normative pluralisms and assuming the state allows another law than its own to operate within its
jurisdiction, the first one (legal pluralism) is possibly a limited and narrowly defined variant of
the very wide - if not limitless - second one (normative pluralism), which in turn, can manifest
itself in single shared facts.
49 Ibid., 159.
50 For a pluralistic approach of Chinese law, see Werner Menski, ComparativeLaw in a Global Context, The
Legal Systems ofAsia andAfrica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 2006) pp. 4 9 3- 59 3
51 Ibid., pp.584-593.
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We need to take into account "non-legal" mechanisms and policies that play the
role of law when considering these societies, and this with a pluralistic attitude.
The major breakthrough of Macdonald's critical pluralism and Vanderlinden's
radical pluralism is a shift of paradigm, just like turning the pyramid of norms on
its head,5 2 looking at things from the perspective of the individual rather than the
state: pluralists do not simply look into what the abstract rule or norm is but may
question the way it is perceived and experienced by a variety of individuals or
social groups. It is like accepting to look into the fact that, as would be the case in
the United States, laws banning certain substances (e.g. marijuana), though colour
blind on paper, are strictly or harshly applied to people with a dark skin while being
largely overlooked in the case of others. All social mechanisms resorted to in order
to solve disputes and re-establish social harmony may not qualify as "law" in the
traditional sense but belong to the corpus of comparative legal studies.
This extends the scope of legal formants identified by Rodolfo Sacco,53 useful
as those may be, in revising our approach to legal sources. Of course, traditional
legal formants, be they legislation, judicial decisions, doctrine or practice, must
be taken into account, but we must consider the "do's" when considering nonWestern cultures. We must also consider the "do's" when studying Western legal
systems because of the constantly evolving social mix and the importance of
immigration, which has an undeniable impact on the way laws are administered in
the postcolonial West.

4

We then end up comparing what at first sight does not look comparable, not
only oranges with oranges but apples with oranges.
Regarding the corpus, the words "comparative law" may be a misnomer for at
least two sets of reasons. First, the word "law" appears in the singular in a sort of
absolute way, as if law was to be compared to itself. At the very least, we should use
a plural (comparative laws), like in Comparer les droits" or Premierspas dans la
comparaisondes droits.56 Second, the word "law" does not include the whole corpus
of what is meant to be compared, at least if it is understood stricto sensu. Either
we accept to refer to "laws" lato sensu, in which case we will have "comparative
laws", or we must substitute a broader term to law, to make it clear that the corpus
includes non-legal (and sometimes illegal) social norms and mechanisms. We may
want to talk about comparative norms, but this is too restrictive as "do's" go beyond
the scope of nonnativity.

52 Jacques Vanderlinden, "Reseaux, pyramide et pluralisme ou regards sur la rencontre de deux aspirantsparadigmes de la science juridique" (n.40).
53 Sacco, "Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law" (n.26).
54 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism:Examining the PoliticsofRecognition (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1994).
55 Jacques Vanderlinden, Comparerles droits (Brussels: Story Scientia, 1995).
56 Olivier Moreteau, "Premiers pas dans la comparaison des droits" in Jean-Claude Gemar and Nicholas
Kasirer (eds.), Jurilinguistique: entre langues et droits; Jurilinguistics:Between Law and Language

(Montreal: Bruylant and Themis, 2005) p.407.
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From the point of view of the corpus, one may advocate for "comparative
laws" with an invitation to embrace the polysemy of the word: would it make us
sinners like our biblical ancestors biting into the fruit of the tree of knowledge?
It does not make us enemies of science, because we go beyond that one tree and
embrace reality with pluralistic eyes. Regarding knowledge, the sin may be to feast
off one unique source or observe from one unique perspective."
The change of adding one letter, the mark of the plural, is minimal, and yet
potentially huge. Traditionalists may be somehow reassured, and critical or radical
pluralists may agree, as they after all stick to the term "legal" pluralism though
inviting to embrace a much broader scope of investigation. We may also accept
"legal comparatism" as a synonym to "comparative laws".
Before making a final proposal, we need to embrace the word "comparative",
which is before all a process.

B.

The Process

Much has been written on the comparative method as applied to the study of the
law," recently to acknowledge the centrality of comparative legal history to legal
science.5 9 In the humanities and social sciences, and also in life sciences, any
phenomenon we approach needs to be observed in the perspective of its origins and
evolution, and the human mind is quick to draw comparisons with other phenomena
of a similar kind. Comparison is part of the cognitive process.60
Writing about the first steps in comparative law, in an attempt to educate and
not discourage the beginner, I wrote:
One is prompt at saying that comparison is a complex and sophisticated
activity best to be left to the trained specialist. Yet, from early childhood, at
the age ofthe first steps, it appears to be the first human intellectual activity.
It is part of the cognitive process and it develops with the acquisition of

57 Olivier Mordteau, "Mare Nostrum as the Cauldron of Western Legal Traditions: Stirring the Broth,
Making Sense of Legal Gumbo whilst Understanding Contamination" (2011) 4 Journal of Civil Law
Studies 516, 536-538.
58 See for instance Pier Giuseppe Monateri (ed.), Methods of Comparative Law (Cheltenham and
Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2012) and Esin Orici, "Methodology of Comparative Law" in Jan M.
442
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Smits (ed.), ElgarEncyclopedia of ComparativeLaw (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2006) p.

59 Aniceto Masferrer, Kjell A Modder and Olivier Mordteau, "The Emergence of Comparative Legal
History" in Mordteau et al., ComparativeLegal History (n.24) pp.1, 6-13. The volume contains essays
by Adolfo Giuliani, Sean Patrick Donlan, Dag Michalsen and Matthew Dyson discussing theory and
methods.
60 As Vivian Curran writes, "[t]he cognitive sciences suggest that each individual's cognition depends on
comparison, because human understanding is a function of relating one entity or domain to another":
Vivian Grosswald Curran, "Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law"
(1998) 46 American Journalof Comparative Law 43, 47, citing George Lakoff, Women, Fire and
DangerousThings: What CategoriesReveal about the Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1987).
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language. With games of shapes and colors, the child is trained to typology.
When noticing that the everyday rules of conduct are more lenient at the
grand-parents' home than at home and later on at school, the child engages
in some form of legal comparatism.6
Law students use comparison from their first day in law school, when they
distinguish public law from private law, compare civil and criminal procedure
and limitation periods in tort and contract, etc. 62 In most jurisdictions, they focus
on just one legal system, but spontaneously, during a study abroad experience or
when hearing of a foreign legal system, they engage in some more or less elaborate
comparative process.
Adults tired of children comparing all the time say that one does not compare
apples with oranges, as if only two things that are alike can be compared. Yet, why
not comparing a pencil with a typewriter and a computer? The moment we look
at them in the light of a function, like producing a text, the comparison of very
different things becomes possible. 63
The comparative process is intimately connected to legal science, addressing
law in its broadest sense as an object of study and knowledge. In this sense, it is
fair to use the word law in the singular, like one does when discussing comparative
anatomy, comparative literature and comparative religion. As Vivian Curran wrote:
"In its essence, comparative legal analysis is just legal analysis, since comparison
is not unique to the field of comparative legal analysis, since, rather, all analysis,
legal and other, is comparative at heart". 64
The current trend of comparative legal studies is to embrace diversity, 65 though
rarely erring towards the extreme and unacceptable view that cultural diversity is an
obstacle to comparison. 6 6 Yet, one should not lose sight of the universal dimension
of human experience, reflected in philosophy and sometimes in anthropology:
though it must not be neglected, cultural diversity may not be of central importance
in making sense of the human experience. Rend Girard has demonstrated that all
desire is mimetic (meaning that our desires are borrowed from other people). 67

.

61 Moreteau, "Premiers pas dans la comparaison des droits" (a56) p.410.
62 See Xavier Thunis, "L'empire de la comparaison" in Frangois van der Menssbrugghe (ed.), L'utilisation
5
de la mithode comparativeen droiteuropden (Namur: Presses universitaires de Namur, 2003) p.
63 This defeats the idea of the presumptio similitudinis, which causes the functional method to be criticised
in recent literature. See Ralf Michaels, "The Functional Method of Comparative Law" in Mathias
Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), The OxfordHandbook of ComparativeLaw (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006) pp.339, 369-372.
64 Vivian Grosswald Curran, "Comparative Law and Language" in Reimann and Zimmermann (eds.), The
Oxford Handbook ofComparativeLaw (n.63) pp.675, 699.

65 See for instance volumes published in the Juris Diversitas Book Series, Ashgate and Routledge.
66 Pierre Legrand, Negative ComparativeLaw (London: Taylor &Francis, 2018).
67 Rene Girard, Mensonge romantique et veritPRomanesque (Paris: Grasset, 1961); Deceit, Desire andthe

Novel (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1965); La violence et le sacrP (Paris: Grasset, 1972); iolence and
the Sacred (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); Des choses cachies depuis lafondation
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Mimetic desire is the source of mimetic rivalry, the source of all human conflicts
leading to spurges of violence. Identifying a scapegoat and murdering it is the
way to bring about desirable peace. A Rend Girard-inspired or mimetic-driven
comparative analysis of the diverse legal systems remains to be written, analysing
laws and policies as tools for channelling violence and restoring social harmony.
At least from an anthropological and philosophical viewpoint, it is likely to reveal
much unity amongst cultural diversity, as also does the concept of natural law.
With these multiple layers, it makes it all the more challenging to discuss the
language of the comparatists.

III.

In What Language? Words of the Comparatists

We comparatists not only face the need of understanding foreign languages and
cultures but also constantly struggle with the choice of words, whether we write
or speak in our native language or in a foreign language. We face the lexicon of
at least two distinct systems depending on how many systems we embrace in our
work. While some scholars do not hesitate to say that the comparative process is
translation, 68 others insist on the need to resort to a neutral language. 69
The conversation is confusing if we discuss the language of comparison in
general. We need to identify what we are doing step by step, remembering that
comparative law is a broad term encompassing a variety of tasks. For the sake of
simplicity, I will break them down in accordance with a commonplace trilogy:
comparative law aims at understanding the law of the other (task 1), comparative
law aims at bridging differences between legal systems and helps identify or develop
a uniform or harmonised law where needed (task 2) and comparative law favours
a better understanding of one's own legal system, sometimes trying to improve
it by importing foreign elements or making sense of those foreign elements that
influence it (task 3). This third task is largely reflexive and derives from the other
two. Though it generates its own words, it will be left out of the scope ofthis paper.
Task 1 is diversity driven, while task 2 is unity driven. Either or both can be
conducted with a practical purpose in mind or for the mere sake of knowledge.
I need to know the law of the other party when doing business with or operating
in the other's foreign environment, but I may want to know the law of another
country out of curiosity, for the sake of knowledge. Likewise, regarding task 2,
the drive to unification and harmonisation may be for a practical purpose. But the
comparatist may also wish to have a broader understanding of existing models, say,
regarding land control, market transactions, family or business organisations and

du monde (Paris: Grasset, 1978) and Things Hidden Since the Foundationofthe World (London: Athlone

Press, 1987).
68 Curran, Comparative Law, An Introduction (n.23) pp.31-45 and Curran, "Comparative Law and

.

Language" (n.64).
69 Moreteau, "Premiers pas dans la comparaison des droits" (a56) pp. 4 2 6- 4 2 8
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control of governmental authorities, dealing with violent crime, simply for the sake
of knowledge. Whether our motivations are practice or knowledge driven is not
always clear, and it does not really matter. Both tend to mingle both in our teaching
and academic writing. Sacco rightly complains that comparatists are put to the test
of proving the usefulness of their activity, as if the pursuit of knowledge itself was
not a legitimate purpose.70
The point is that the language we need, the words we use, is not the same
whether we analyse, describe or teach a foreign legal system (task 1) or engage
in system building (task 2, which must be preceded by task 1).71 While the first
activity has much to do with translation, the second one is hard to achieve without
some kind of metalanguage.

A.

Analysing the Law of the Other: Comparative Law
as Translation

The first step in a comparative study is the description of the law of the other.
It is easy when the systems we compare share the same origins and are expressed
in one language, like the civil codes of Belgium and France, though the similarity
of interpretation is never guaranteed. 72 However, the law of the other is usually
expressed in a foreign language. Vivian Curran opens her study of comparative law
and language with the following words:
At the simplest level of observation, language issues arise in connection
with comparative law because people in different countries speak in
different languages, producing legal texts in foreign languages that become
the target of comparative legal studies. 73
Comparatists must be multilingual,74 and "the range of legal cultures they can study
by the foreign languages they know" is necessarily limited. 75 These limits also
apply to the audience of comparative work. As Vivian Curran says:

70 Rodolfo Sacco, La comparaisonjuridique au service de la connaissance du droit (Paris: Economica,
1991) pp.5-8. In Zweigert and Kdtz, An Introductionto ComparativeLaw (n.13) p.15, the authors do not

shy at asserting that "the primary aim of comparative law is knowledge".
71 InMoreteau, "Premiers pas dans la comparaisondes droits" (n.56) pp.425-428, I first discuss the language
of the foreign system, and then the need of a neutral language of reference for the sake of comparison
72 Contrast for instance the interpretation of art. 1384, para.1 in France and in Belgium. See Olivier Moreteau,
"Basic Questions of Tort Law from a French Perspective" in Helmut Koziol (ed.), Basic Questionsof Tort
Lawfrom a ComparativePerspective (Vienna: Jan Sramek Verlag, 2015) pp.3, 67-69.

73 Curran, "Comparative Law and Language" (a64) p.676.
74 On hyperpolyglots or language superlearners, see Michael Erard, Babel No More: The Searchfor the
World s Most ExtraordinaryLanguage Learners (New York: Free Press, 2012).

75 Curran, "Comparative Law and Language" (a64) p.678.
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if foreign language knowledge is crucial, then even a polyglot comparative
law scholar may not be able to communicate successfully to students
who are unable to read foreign texts except in translation, thus reducing
comparative law's educational potential .76
The best approach is for the comparatist to discover the foreign system by immersion
and then expose it by translation, a process also familiar to comparative-literature
and comparative-religion scholars.
(i)

Discovering Othemess by Immersion

The best way to study a foreign legal system is not only to read its source
documents in the original language but also to visit the foreign jurisdiction and
experience its culture, legal and at large, by way of immersion, which may also
include field experience and practice. "The immersion approach in comparative
legal analysis suggests the importance of trying to understand foreign legal cultures
in an untranslated form; i.e., through the prisms that shape perceptions in the target
legal culture". 77 Vivian Curran explains that "[t]his implies both an expansion and
alteration of the comparatist's prisms", 78 an experience that is rarely described in
legal literature 79 but is sometimes shared by comparatists in the form of anecdotes
in the classroom, during public lectures or at the dinner table.
As Grossfeld writes: "Different languages represent different world-views.
When we learn another language we unconsciously adopt its speakers' world
of thought: 'Language thinks in us"'. 80 For this reason, working from translated
texts is less useful because translation is already the result of comparative legal
analysis; perceptions will be "contaminated" by the work of the translator. The
problem is not circular but linear, and it is only a risk, not a necessity: "Whereas
translation precedes comparative legal analysis, legal translation 'merely' risks
being inadequate without prior comparative legal analysis". 82

76 Ibid.
77 Curran, "CulturalImmersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law" (n.60) 57.
78 Ibid.

79 See Vanderlinden, "Here, There and Everywhere . . or Nowhere? Some Comparative and Historical
Afterthoughts About Custom as a Source of Law" (n.33) p.157 (discussing the problem of succession in
the chiefdomwiththe Zande chief Ukwatutu); see also Rene David, Les avatarsd'un comparatiste(Paris:
Economica, 1982).
80 Grossfeld, Strength and Weakness of ComparativeLaw (a2) p.96, citing Emil Wezel, Sprache und Geist

.

(Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1935) p.iv and referring to the philosophy of language of Gottfried von Herder
and Wilhelm von Humboldt: "For Humboldt language is the formative organ of thought. It is not just a
device for representing the truth, but 'much more, of discovering truth hitherto unrecognised"' (ibid.).
81 CJW Baaij, "Translation and the 'Contamination' of Comparative Legal Research" in Simone Glanert
(ed.), ComparativeLaw - Engaging Translation(Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2014) p. 1 04
82 Ibid., p.106, emphasis in the original. Hence, the need for the linguist to be trained in comparative law
before engaging into legal translation: see Guadalupe Soriano-Barabino, Comparative Law for Legal
Translators(Oxford: Peter Lang, 2016).
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However, as much as it is important to absorb the original culture by its own
prisms and channels:
comparatists need to retain their stance as outsiders even as they acquire
insight into the insiders' view. Otherwise they will fail to perceive with
sufficient acuity those fundamental, powerful aspects oftarget legal cultures
which are so entrenched as to be unarticulated and even unconscious.83
The comparatist should be what French philosopher Michel Serres calls a TersInstruit, an educated outsider, a TroubadourofKnowledge as translators have it."
As much as it is necessary to master the language of the other, we need
to assess the difference between what is spoken and what is not." The general
tendency in Western cultures is to speak out and address matters explicitly. Yet
there are variations. In the traditional close-knit English society, understatements
are commonplace, and the phrase "I would not do it that way" expresses strong
reprobation. By comparison, Americans are fond of superlative expression and
exaggeration, and use explicit language, probably because the population is not
homogenous and does not share a centuries-old common code, like the English or
the French. In Japan, the proportion of the spoken to the unspoken is allegedly of 1
to 9: "The general view is that the less verbal one's position is, the more polite and
rich it is in implications".86
Rodolfo Sacco has characterised the implicit models and notions that can be
invisible or hidden formants as "cryptotypes"," and shows their importance in the
understanding oflaws, legal language and legal cultures, as markers of the mentality
of a legal system. He explains that they become visible through the comparison
with another system where the same notions are explicit. The synecdoche orpars
pro toto is another example." Bernhard Grossfeld has these insightful words:

83 Curran, "CulturalImmersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law" (n.60) 57-58, citing
George Steiner, On Difficulty andOther Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) p.26, who wrote
that "learning [is] the suspension of reflex".
84 Michel Serres, Le Tiers-Instruit,Gallimard 1992, transl. Sheila Faria Glaser with William Paulson as The
Troubadour ofKnowledge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).
85 Grossfeld, Strength and Weakness of ComparativeLaw (n.2) p.97.

86 Sayo Yotsukura, "Ethnolinguistic Introduction to Japanese Literature" in William C McCormack and
Stephen A Wurm (eds.), Language and Thought, AnthropologicalIssues (The Hague: Mouton, 1977)

pp.261, 263. Yosiyuki Noda, Introduction to JapaneseLaw (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1976)
pp.9-13, with a description of the Japanese language, summarised by Grossfeld, Strength and Weakness
of ComparativeLaw (a2) p.100, in the following terms: "Japanese is better adapted to the expression
of feeling than to logical argument; as a language of poetry rather than scholarship, it is not good at
expressing logical relations".
87 The word points to what is hidden. Sacco, La comparaisonjuridiqueau service de la connaissancedu

droit (n.70) pp.105-108.
88 Pier Giuseppe Monateri, "Regles et technique de la definition dans le droit des obligations et des contrats
en France et en Allemagne : la synecdoque frangaise" (1984) Revue internationalede droitcompare 7.

The Words of Comparative Law

199

rules of conduct generally are only in part made known through language;
what is most important often remains "between the lines", "between one
word and another". The silent space between words is of different breadth
in different cultures. Words "swim" on an "ocean" of silence; they relate
to a common, silent background.89
Even in legal systems that favour explicit language, such as the United States, there
appear some untranslatable words which, while ubiquitous, express the American
legal mind. It takes prolonged immersion in the United States to get a fair perception
of concepts such as "law", "policy", "due process", "fairness", "reasonableness",
"deference", and "discretion". 90 Conversely, some civil law concepts challenge
common law-trained scholars. 9' Think for instance of the distinction between
"juridical acts" and 'juridical facts".
As much as immersion matters, 92 the comparatist must not neglect external
literature on the target legal system (ie, books or articles written by third-country
scholars), especially when written by reputable comparatists. Doing so implies a
judgment call as to whether the author has experienced immersion and regarding
the time and context of the publication.
Jaakko Husa insists that "the question concerning the comprehension of
substance of law is more fundamental than purely technical linguistic orientation". 93
This by no means undermines the importance of language, legal and general. The
comparatist is a passeur, a go-between vested with the duty of communicating
the words of otherness to the home audience, which in essence is an exercise in
translation.
(ii)

Communicating Otherness by Translation

After or during the immersion in the foreign legal system, the comparatist is called
upon to share the knowledge ofthe foreign legal system with students, scholars and
the "real" world as one sometimes describes practice in academic circles. Whether

89 Bernhard Grossfeld, Kernfragen der Rechtsvergleichung, Mohr 1996, translated by Vivian Curran,
ComparativeLaw, An Introduction(n.23) p.34.

90 George P Fletcher and Steve Sheppard, American Law in a Global Context, The Basics (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005) pp. 5 4- 7 4 ("The Language of Law") and George P Fletcher, "Fair and
Reasonable. A Linguistic Glimpse into the American Legal Mind" in Rodolfo Sacco and Luca Castellani
(eds.), Les Multiples langues du droiteuropeen uniforme (Turin: L'Harmattan Italia, 1999) p.57.

91 Shawn Marie Boyne, "Translating Civil Law 'Objectivity' with an Adversarial Brain: An Ethnographic
Perspective" in Glanert (ed.), ComparativeLaw -Engaging

Translation(a81) p.123.

92 This part of the effort is rarely rewarded in terms of academic recognition (see Olivier Moreteau, "Ne
tirez pas sur le comparatiste" (2005) Rec Dalloz 452), but the return on investment is usually immense
regarding personal and scholarly enrichment.
93 Jaakko Husa, "Understanding Legal Languages: Linguistic Concerns of the Comparative Lawyer" in
CJW. Baaij (ed.), The Role ofLegal Translation in LegalHarmonization (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer,
2012) pp.161, 178. In Husa, A New Introductionto ComparativeLaw (n.3) p.195, he writes: "Must the

comparatist be a linguistic genius?" The answer is: "no", which will sound as good news for many a
reader
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or not actual translation is needed, this is an exercise in communication that implies
translation or is very similar to translation. Familiarity with the experience of
teaching English and American law to a French audience in English or in French,
and teaching French law or civil law systems to an Anglo-American audience in
English or at times in French, helps understand that these are exercises in crossborder communication, passing both systemic legal borders and linguistic borders.94
Legal translation is indeed different from other types of specialised translations.95
Vivian Curran understands that "the decoding process, whether of foreign
language or law, is a process of translation. Understanding translation's mechanisms
thus illuminates the process of comparative law. Translation is both de-coding and
re-coding, identifying and constructing meaning".96
The facts that based on some neuroscience breakthrough, some linguists and
philosophers of languages can now demonstrate that the human brain is wired for
the acquisition of language and that all the languages of the world are governed by
a limited set of structures, at the first sight, seem to contradict the above analysis.97
Yet, they do not dissipate the mysteries of communication, which always lies
beyond language.98 As Curran has it:
The polyglot knows that much alterity is not apparent. The polyglot legal
comparatist knows that legal orders reside as much beneath and aside from
words as they do in the words that purport to embody them.99
Translation is an exercise in communication and construction of meaning. The
word translation literally means the process of moving something from one place

94 Olivier Moreteau, "Les frontieres de la langue et du droit" in Rodolfo Sacco (ed.), The New Ambitions of
LegalScience: LegalAnthropologyand Legal Traductology (n.4) p.63 and "Les frontieres de la langue et
du droit: vers une methodologie de la traductionjuridique" (2009) Revue internationalede droitcompare
695.
95 Simone Glanert, "Translation Matters" in Glanert ComparativeLaw - EngagingTranslation(n.81) p.1.
See also Jan Engberg, "Comparative Law for Translation: The Key to Successful Mediation between
Legal Systems" in Anabel Borja Albi and Fernando Prieto Ramos (eds.), Legal Translationin Context,
ProfessionalIssues and Prospects (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013) p.9, citing Michael Harvey, "What's so
Special about Legal Translation?" (2002) Meta 47, 179-182, who points to four aspects: "(1) legal
discourse gives rise to legal effects, (2) law is a system-bound discipline, (3) requirements on fidelity
are higher than in other areas, and (4) legal texts are characterized by ambiguity and interpretation". See
more generally, Le Cheng, King Kui Sin and Anne Wagner, The Ashgate Handbook ofLegal Translation
(Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2014).
96 Curran, "Comparative Law and Language" (a64) p.679.
97 Noam Chomsky, On Nature and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Language
and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed., 2006) and Steven Pinker, The Language
Instinct, How the Mind CreatesLanguage (New York: William Morrow, 1994).
98 George Steiner, Languageand Silence: Essays on Language, Literature, and the Inhuman (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1998) p.x. On the significance of implications, see Marmor, The Language ofLaw
(n.4) pp.35-43, 85-105; he discusses the varieties of vagueness in the law.
99 Curran, "Comparative Law and Language" (a64) p.680.

The Words of Comparative Law

201

to another, acknowledging the existence of some space between these two places, a
space in-between that must be visited by the translator 00
Walter Benjamin says that the task ofthe translator is not that ofa communicator
but of a craftsman contributing towards the achievement of the text by some sort of
alchemy.' 0 ' The translator's task aims at expressing the most intimate connection
between languages, to identify a core that resists translation. Benjamin used
the metaphor of a broken vessel, the original language providing incomplete
fragments, some missing ones to be brought by the other language. The vessel
will only near perfection once it is translated.1 0 2 Benjamin's metaphor shows the
proximity of translation and interpretation, 03 both in a linguistic and an artistic
sense. The cellist interpreting a Bach score must decipher silences between the
signs.' 4 The comparatist-translator is also an interpreter and may be, occasionally,
an artist. Jean-Claude Gemar demonstrates how one can catch the "spirit" of the
law when co-drafting the text in several languages rather than translating. He
proves Benjamin's point in showing how co-drafting produces a three-dimensional,
unbroken vessel.

05

When teaching English law in English to French students, I nonetheless
have to translate, to equip them with the common law English terminology and
the ability to express it in French. 06 Meeting the untranslatables, I tell them
to keep the word in English and provide neologisms or periphrases as tools of
communication. I recommend against translating terms such as "trusts", "Court
of Appeal", "Master of the Rolls" and "frustration" of contract, but tell them
that there is no problem with using Chambre des lords when talking about the
House of Lords, replaced by a Supreme Court in 2009. Why? Because this is a
literal translation, a decal, devoid of risk of confusion with a French institution, a
danger that existed when translating "Court of Appeal". Overall, when teaching
a foreign law, it may be a good idea to use source-based translation, a translation

100 Anne Wagner, "A Space in-Between- Legal TranslationAs a 'Third Space"' (2016) 9 JournalofCivil
Law Studies 167.

.

101 WalterBenjamin, "The Task of the Translator" Selected Writings(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
Vol.1 (1913-1926), 1996) p. 2 5 3
102 Ibid., p.260.

103 Jean-Jacques Sueur (ed.), Interpreteret traduire (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007) with an essay by Frangois
Ost, "Les detours de Babel" 13; see also Frangois Ost, Traduire.Defense et illustrationdu multilinguisme
(Paris: Fayard, 2009).
104 Alain Levasseur uses the verb decipher in the context of code interpretation: Alain A Levasseur,
Decipheringa Civil Code, Sources ofLaw and Methods ofInterpretation(Durham: Carolina Academic

Press, 2015).
105 Jean-Claude Gemar, "Catching the Spirit of the Law: From Translation to Co-drafting" in Glanert (ed.),
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ComparativeLaw -Engaging Translation (n.81) p.
106 Husa, A New Introductionto ComparativeLaw (a3) p.195 insists on:

the need to resort to material in the original language or at least in key issues to examine the
contents of the foreign law (also) directly in the original language. When the aim is to reach the
legal-cultural level in comparative law a basic ability of some sort to read and perceive foreign
legal language is necessary.
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as close as possible to the original. One may do the same in writing, as I did in
Droitanglaisdes affaires.10 7
A source-based approach is recommended when translating legislation, 08
whereas a target-based approach is acceptable when translating doctrinal texts.' 09
Nicholas Kasirer invites us to use Geny's method of interpretation (libre recherche
scientifique) as a translation method,"o a suitable approach when translating
doctrine."'
Our central point here is to convey what we learn about the foreign system to our
home audience, and this is a place where we have to transcend the untranslatable,
make it clear and complete, making Benjamin's broken vessel fully visible in three
dimensions.11 2 This act of translation-communication-interpretation pushes the
comparatist to get an even better understanding of the foreign system than during
the immersion experience." Questions by students and comments on our papers
force us to go beyond and fill silences with words and sounds, bringing additional
depth and dimension. Teaching a foreign system or exposing it in books and articles
is not meant to be literal translation of the foreign literature and language, as useful
as this may be in some contexts,"' but a creative activity transcending what we
observe, making it more complete than its description in the original literature
and yet re-presenting it in a fully authentic way. The "spirit" of the law breathes
in this in-between language or third space identified by Anne Wagner and Walter
Benjamin."1 5
The comparatist like the translator or the interpreter must be selfless, offering a
"creation ofthe second degree" as explains Simon Leys with a musical comparison:
Glenn Gould and Sviatoslav Richter are no less artists for not having
themselves composed The Well-Tempered Clavier. Great interpreters
efface themselves the better to serve their models; but the more successful
they are at this task, the more deeply their individual temperament and
sensitivities are being revealed in their interpretations. Every touch from a

107 Olivier Morteau, Droit anglaisdes affaires (Paris: Dalloz, 2000).
108 See the translation of the Louisiana Civil Code from English to French: Olivier Mordteau, Le Code civil
de Louisiane, edition bilingue (Paris: Socidt6 de 16gislation compare, 2017) and "The Louisiana Civil
Code in French: Translation and Retranslation" (2016) 9 JournalofCivil Law Studies 223.
109 On the distinction of source-based and target-based translation, see Jean-Rend Ladmiral, Sourcier ou
cibliste, Les profondeursde la traduction (Paris: Les belles lettres, 2014).

110 Nicholas Kasirer, "Frangois Gdny's libre recherche scientifique As a Guide for Legal Translation"
(2001) 61 LouisianaLaw Review 61, 331.
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111 Olivier Mordteau, "La traduction de l'euvre de Franqois Gdny: m6thode de traduction et sources
doctrinales" in Olivier Cachard, Francois-Xavier Licari and Franqois Lormant (eds.), La pensee de
FrancoisGeny (Paris: Dalloz, 2013) p. 6 9
112 Benjamin, "The Task of the Translator" (n.101) p.260.
113 See the description of the immersion experience in the sub-paragraph above.
114 In Mordteau, "La traduction de l'euvre de Frangois Gdny: m6thode de traduction et sources doctrinales"
(n.I11) pp.80-81, I contrast the respective merits of free and literal translation of doctrinal texts.
115 See a100 and n.101, respectively.
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great pianist, every stroke from a great calligrapher, becomes a mirror of
the interpreter's mind.116
When building systems however, the comparatist has a chance to move from the
role of translator-interpreter to that of architect or composer.

B.

Building Systems: the Need for a Neutral Language

Before addressing neutral words, a caveat is needed. Are the words we use ever
neutral? The comparatist is a "rooted cosmopolitan"" 7 with large sometimes
worldwide views, but a national or local system of reference, all too often located
in the West. We are conditioned by the language and culture we evolve in,"8 a
leitmotiv in this paper. Even when gifted with a broad mind, we have a natural
tendency to favour words reflecting our time, culture and tradition.
When comparing different legal systems from an identified and external point of
view (tertium comparationis),we should use a neutral language or a metalanguage.
In comparative anatomy, who would compare "cat legs" with "human legs" or
"dog paws" with "human paws"? If looking at things with a scientific eye, you do
not choose between human perspective and animal perspective but use a neutral
language of "upper" and "lower limbs", understanding that upper means closer
to the head." But here again, this arrangement reflects Western structuralist
perceptions. Asian and African cultures may propose more fluid perceptions or
representations of the human and animal body.
Much has been done in the realm of private and public international law to
develop a common language to facilitate the response to identified needs, sometimes
with the help of comparatists, though this language is not necessarily neutral. Much
is to be done in the speculative realm of theoretical knowledge to develop a neutral
language. We will briefly explore the common language in the empire ofusefulness
before speculating on a neutral language in a kingdom of uselessness.
(i)

Common Words of Usefulness: International Law and Practice

Public international law was not built out of thin air but using building blocks
of the civil law and common law traditions. The fact that this area of the law is
developed in a limited number of languages favours the emergence of a common
language of international law that more easily translates into other languages than
will ever be the case in the realm of private law. The common language of public

.

116 Simon Leys, The Hall of Uselessness, CollectedEssays (n.18) pp.310-3 11.
117 Bruce Ackerman, "Rooted Cosmopolitanism" (1994) 104 Ethics 516.
118 William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)
p. 50
119 Moreteau, "Premiers pas dans la comparaison des droits" (n.56) p.426.
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international law directly derives from the law of Western nations. 20 It reflects the
experience of the colonising powers rather than the colonised people and cannot
be described as neutral terminology. The words of international human rights also
reflect Western values like fair trial' 2 1 or respect for private life.1 22 Likewise, the
World Trade Organization is also developing a language of international trade law,
predominantly expressed in English but translatable in other languages, based on
the experience of developed countries of the West.
Private international law develops in a more decentralised manner, as is
particularly the case with the law of international business transactions. One notes
the leadership of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. The
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) has largely
contributed to the promotion of a common language of contract law expressed in
the six official languages of the Convention.1 23 A strong common law influence is
noted with notions such as "fundamental breach" (art.25), "anticipatory breach"
(arts.71-73) or "fitness" (art.35). "Remedies" (arts.45-52 and 61-65) is clearly
a common law word, which has been promoted so as to become a neutral term
usable in comparative law.1 24 Others are more neutral such as "conformity of the
goods" (arts.35-44),"avoidance" (arts.49 and 64) or "exemption" (art.79), though
the French force majeure is elsewhere a standard. The development of widely
available soft-law instruments such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts, published in 1994 and updated in 2016, or the Principles of
European Contract Law, also known as PECL or Lando Principles, contribute to the
fine-tuning of the language of international business transactions. For instance, in
the UNIDROIT Principles, "avoidance" is used in the context of contract validity
where there would be nullity (civil law) or a void or voidable contract (common
law), the word "termination" being used in the context of non-performance (rather
than breach in the CISG).
The plurality of sources favours the improvement of this terminology while
bringing some diversity. One notes that many distinguished comparatists contribute
to the drafting and updating of these instruments, thereby manufacturing convenient
terms in contract-related matters. These always derive from the civil law and
common law traditions and therefore from Western experience. Largely for practical
reasons, which happen to coincide with the hegemony of some nations, English has

120 See Hersch Lauterpacht, PrivateLaw Sources andAnalogiesofInternationalLaw (London: Longmans,
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become a lingua franca in world affairs and in the context of the European Union,
a reality likely to survive Brexit.1 25
When it comes to the rules of conflict of laws, the Hague Conference is taking
a leading role not only in standardising the terminology but also in establishing
uniform rules.1 26 Regarding terminology, one notes that scholars resort to Latin
when describing, for instance, the law applicable in the jurisdiction where the
court sits (lex fori), the law applicable to the contract (lex contractus), the law
of the place where the damage occurred (lex loci delicti) or the law of the place
where the property is located (lex rei sitae). Latin has the advantage of being a
dead language: the meaning of words no longer changes, which is much needed
in a specialty language.1 27 Latin offers a wonderfully stable common and neutral
language to zoologists and botanists, allowing them to communicate with their
brethren speaking different languages. Latin terms are broadly used in comparative
law conferences, which brings us to the kingdom of uselessness.
(ii)

Neutral Words of Uselessness? System Building in Comparative Law

Legal science does not have a specialty language.1 28 Legal terms are given a
normative meaning inside each legal order. They are therefore not suitable for
comparative work, because there is constant doubt as to whether a term is used in
a neutral way or with its normative meaning inside a legal system. Developing a
metalanguage requires imagination and may be done at the risk of being rejected by
national jurists, who may no longer understand what we are talking about, except
in the fields of international trade and international law where a common language
has already developed.
When doing comparative law in English, we tend to prefer the common law
lexicon, speaking of the comparative law of torts rather than referring to civilian
delictual or extra-contractual liability. Why not discuss a law of wrongs, thereby

125 Barbara Pozzo, "English as a Legal Lingua Franca in the EU Multilingual Context" in Baaij (ed.), The
Role of Legal Translation in Legal Harmonization (n.93) p.183 and Olivier Mordteau, "Can English

Become the Common Legal Language in Europe?" in Rainer Schulze and Gianmaria Ajani (eds.),
405
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Common PrinciplesofEuropeanPrivateLaw (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003) p.

126 Hans van Loon, "The Hague Conference on Private International Law: Asser's Vision and an Evolving
Mission" [2011] 24 Hague Yearbook of International Law 3 and "Globalisation and the Hague
Conference on Private International Law" (2000) 2 InternationalLaw Forum 230.
127 Mordteau (n.125) p.415. Heikki ES Mattila, ComparativeLegal Linguistics: Language ofLaw, Latin

and ModernLingua Francas(Burlington: Ashgate, 2nd ed., 2013) also prefers Latin.
128 Jacques Vanderlinden, "Les nouvelles ambitions de la science du juriste. Une langue gdndrale de
spdcialisation est-elle une utopie?" in Rodolfo Sacco (ed.), The New Ambitions ofLegal Science: Legal
Anthropology and Legal Traductology (n.4) pp.13, 14 (my translation):

Legal science ought necessarily to be expressed in a specialty language, in which all elements
that may be found in legal notions as the result of in depth and rigorous analytical work may be
formulated in as neutral a way as possible. There are many examples, from high-profile scholars,
of complaints regarding the lack of precision and polysemy of the legal language. However, little
has been done to address the matter
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using a neutral term and avoiding common law and civil law connotations?1 29 When
exploring the law of contract, we use the word "contract" in a neutral or generic
way, whether we refer to common law contracts (agreement plus consideration)
or contrat,contrattoor Vertrag, agreements that may include gratuitous promises.
A neutral language may consist of broad meta-terms or meta-categories that
must be defined for the purpose of the comparison or in breaking down common
concepts into smaller units, at times resorting to mathematical language and
inviting for complex equations. It may be a combination of both. Its use would
no doubt make comparative studies more precise or accurate but also complicated
to read when consisting of complex equations. Fortunately, we have the option of
using metaphors when teaching or addressing a general audience, just as scientists
sometimes do with success.' 30
Vanderlinden has done a remarkable experiment in the context of expectations
human beings may have regarding landholding.' 3 ' He reflects on the use of symbols
and formulae reminiscent of chemistry. 3 2 When I discussed the matter with him,
he regretted that he could not use three-dimensional representations. Languagewise, he uses Indo-European roots, and the terms he coins are precise and apt for
detailed analysis, as are his diagrams here and in other comparative law exercises.' 33
His efforts are worthy of discussion, and an international conference should be
convened on the matter.
My own efforts are nowhere as detailed, as I have tried to define broad metacategories to put the basic concepts of civil obligations in perspective rather than
identifying every molecule as Vanderlinden does. In my work on estoppel and the
protection of reliance,'34 I attempt to map the law ofobligations moving from a threecorner approach (contract-tort-restitution) to a four-corner scheme (contract-tortrestitution-reliance), in an attempt to offer a model that could help compare many
different legal systems. On my PowerPoint presentations, each corner is identified
by an initial: E (estoppel) stands for reliance, to avoid confusion with restitution, but
the key point is that C [contract], T [tort], R [restitution] and E [estoppel/reliance]
are preliminarily redefined as meta-concepts or neutral terms, not to be confused
with the corresponding notion in national legal systems. My project was to show

129 Eric Descheemaeker, The Division of Wrongs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). However,
whether the European Group on Tort Law will want to be renamed "European Group on Wrong Law" is
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that Western legal systems wrestle with issues that occur at the intersection of
contracts, torts and restitution, a grey zone difficult to map as legal systems do not
agree on the definition and scope of contract. Liability for medical malpractice can
be in tort or in contract, as can liability for breach of a pre-contractual arrangement.
Working from a broad and neutral definition of tort, contract and restitution, and
adding a broad and neutral category of reliance, it becomes possible to map the law
of obligations and it gets easier to compare various legal systems, getting a better
understanding of their solutions, particularly in obscure or grey areas.
The harmonisation efforts mentioned in the previous sub-paragraph help only
to some extent but they lack an overall view or comprehensive perspective: some
groups work on contracts, others on torts, and all neglect defining major categories,
because legal systems do not agree, while some remain invisible as is the case with
reliance.
The challenge is to craft words that can be accepted by other comparatists and
pass the translation test. Using Latin avoids the need of translating meta-categories
in various national languages. In the context of my study, one may want to use
contractus, delictus, restitutioandfactum proprium.'35
Whether the suggested meta-categories can be used outside the Western world
remains to be seen, and the work will have to be done by others. I have a sense that
applied to Chinese law, a focus on praxis, more than on black-letter law, would
show that the contract corner is much weaker in practice than on paper, business
relationships being culturally perceived as a continuum rather than the succession
of a negotiation and a performance stage, separated like two movements in a
symphony or sonata. Much probably happens in the vicinity of the reliance comer,
which matches the necessary fluidity of business relations.
These meta-categories dwell in the mind of the comparatist as a tertium
comparationis. They are not meant to be substitutes for existing concepts and
institutions prevailing in legal systems. They are scientific in nature, tools of
knowledge and understanding. They may be metalinguistic and shape the third
space identified when discussing translation.
Whether we discuss a precise neutral language or meta-categories, this is
aspirational utopia. Many a reader will conclude that it is not worth the effort
because if jurists have not done it yet, it must be useless. As useless as science
can be, who guessed that modem medicine would emerge from the Renaissance
theatres of anatomy and that the efforts of astronomers would one day give us the
GPS? The problem is that jurists do not like to act as scientists;' 36 they fear that

135 Factumproprium describes actions or omissions that generate reliance. Venire contrafactum proprium

(going against one's own previous conduct) is the Roman law version of estoppel: Thiago Luis Sombra,
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136 Andreas Rahmatian, "Alchemistic Metaphors in Comparative Law: Mixed Legal Systems, Reception of
Laws and Legal Transplants" (2018) 11 JournalofCivil Law Studies 231, 257-258.

208

Journal of International and Comparative Law

they will not be taken seriously or be considered to be out of touch with reality.
Reliance on unification and harmonisation efforts does not suffice, as they broaden
but also narrow the horizons of the comparatist. Legal science needs the help of
anthropologists, sociologists, linguists, etc. who can accompany the efforts of the
comparatists by lending their language.

IV.

Words of Conclusion?

The world of comparative law is in constant motion and so are its words. This paper
tried to define the corpus of the activity, to show that it goes beyond the law as we
traditionally understand it, to include "do's", practices or policies. The comparative
process was approached as intimately connected to our cognitive abilities. Then
followed a step-by-step analysis of what we comparatists do when analysing
the law of the other: it is to be discovered by immersion and communicated by
translation. Comparatists, however, often go beyond the study and description of
foreign systems. They build systems, fabricating or using a common language.
The challenge for generations to come is to develop a specialty language for legal
science, with neutral words fit for the study of very different systems and metacategories that help towards a better understanding of the legal universe.
Let us turn to a master of comparative law and language for the final word
to this paper. Vivian Curran helps us understand that words are our tools, which
constantly need to be reinvented or perfected:
As translator of legal meaning, comparative law always has to invent and
reinvent tools with which to translate. The paradox is that this undertaking,
however descriptive in nature its ultimate objective may be, requires the
ability to destroy its own past rigidities and manners of perceiving, its own
methods of decoding and transmitting, in order to construct a new modality
of analysis, a new vocabulary better adapted to changed contemporaneous
meanings in the perpetually chameleon-like world of new presences,
claims, standards, and influences, in which the legal and extra-legal
increasingly criss-cross to the point of becoming indistinguishable, and
whose juncture are the more difficult to perceive to the extent that they are
unexpected.17

137 Curran,"Comparative Law and Language" (n.64) p.706.

